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INTRODUCTION
Artistic freedom is only implicitly regulated underArticle 10 of the European Convention on HumanRights, a provision which is phrased in
comparatively general terms. Article 10 provides:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive
and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall
not prevent states from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties
and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law
and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others,
for the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
In the Article 10 provision, the European Convention on
Human Rights essentially protects freedom of speech.
Included in the idea of speech is “symbolic” speech, which
is not specified in the article, but which covers, inter alia,
artistic works. Amongst the artistic works protected are
visual art and creative writing, which are the media
featured here. Unsurprisingly, it is freedom of expression
rather than speech per se that is the Strasbourg system’s
preferred nomenclature for protection purposes in this
area, and the term “expression” obviously has a special
resonance in the artistic context now considered.
What sort of disputes concern us? The fundamental
conflict between art and law under Article 10 occurs in the
sphere of the proscription of immoral communications, an
area that sometimes, lamentably, embraces morally-
controversial art. Art is not afforded a special place for
public-moral purposes under the Convention; arguably, it
should be. Art has a distinct ontology, and is culturally
recognised as a discrete body of value, being emergent
from the creativity of individuals, which has a certain
spiritual significance, that is reflected, for example, in the
French intellectual property term “oeuvres d’esprit” (“works
of the mind/spirit”). From a purist, spiritual perspective,
when art is pitched against public-moral considerations,
the fruits of artistic expressivity should be accommodated
and protected within the law’s relevant tests and
mechanisms. A personal opinion is that the
philosophically- and culturally-recognised autonomy of art
should invite special individual treatment of art by law-
makers so that any perceived “transgressions” of
acceptable moral boundaries by it in a societal context are
understood to be taking place within the artistic order, ie
within art’s normal internal canons of operation. This level
of juridical selective treatment, as we will see, is yet to be
achieved under the Convention, despite the alleged parity
of each cultural sub-set of society, including art, within the
central tenets of cultural recognition in the present era,
which is sometimes philosophically known as egalitarian
postmodernism.
THE PERTINENT CASE LAW
In Handyside v United Kingdom, E Ct HRR A 24 (1976), 1
EHRR 737, the applicant was the publisher of The Little Red
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Schoolbook, a book for children that included a chapter with
subsections giving advice on sexual issues. He was
prosecuted under the Obscene Publications Act 1959 and
was convicted. By 13 votes to 1, the European Court of
Human Rights held that the conviction was not a breach of
freedom of speech under Article 10. In reaching this result,
the court followed its own collective reasoning in terms
which permitted a certain margin of appreciation or
discretion to a defendant state in its assessment of what the
public interest requires. In Handyside, which was later to be
treated as a seminal case, the court pronounced that:
“[I]t is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various
contracting states a uniform European conception of morals.
The view taken by their respective laws of the requirements of
morals varies from time to time and from place to place,
especially in our era which is characterised by a rapid and far-
reaching evolution of opinions on the subject. By reason of
their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of
their countries, state authorities are in principle in a better
position than the international judge to give an opinion on
the exact content of these requirements….”
Unwittingly, the court thereby opened the floodgates for
narrow, and even antiquated, “moral” standards in
individual states to dictate the outcome of cases taken to it.
This matters crucially because the court represents the
summit of an appellate route the applicant expressly
follows as the very consequence of his/her perceived
unfairness of the narrowness of alleged domestic/national
“moral” conceptions, in the hope that the Strasbourg court
will take, as its remit suggests, a broader and more
enlightened approach to “morality”, unconnected with
merely local, harmfully parochial scruples.
In the next relevant case, the Commission, in X and Y v
United Kingdom, 28 DR 77 (1982), held that the applicant’s
conviction for the controversial crime of blasphemy was
not a breach of Article 10. In that case, a poem and
accompanying illustration depicting the sexual activity of a
contemporary male soldier with the body of the dead
Christ was the source of the complaint. It was not
suggested in Strasbourg that because the material had
featured in Gay News, which was designed for an audience
of homosexual and bisexual people, the imagery may not
have proved as potentially “depraving” (a very old-
fashioned concept that assumes a sort of innocent purity in
an audience of adults). In fact, the allegedly offensive
material may not have reached anyone at all for whom it
may have been allegedly harmful, given the limited number,
as well as the specialised sexual orientation, of the
readership. The Commission also entertained no thought
that it might be highly relevant that the condemned work
was art, which is not meant to be taken literally, but, rather,
as an invitation to a reaction not dissimilar to that
habitually pertaining to humour (art, like humour, having
an oblique rather than a literal intention of operating,
which should be rightly and properly considered, with due
respect to its distinctive ontology, by any given adult
audience).
In a subsequent consistent case, Muller v Switzerland, E Ct
HRR A 113 (1991), 13 EHRR 212, the first applicant was
an established artist who was convicted under a Swiss
obscenity law for publishing obscene articles in an
exhibition of contemporary art. The three paintings
involved were said by the court of first instance to give free
vein to licentiousness and even perversion, a circumstance
morally offensive to the vast majority of the population. At
the European Court of Human Rights, by a majority of 6
votes to 1, it was held that the artist’s conviction was not in
breach of Article 10, a result which was said to be
consistent with the Handyside ruling. In its judgment, the
court opined:
“[C]onceptions of sexual morality have changed in recent
years. Nevertheless, having inspected the original paintings,
the Court does not find unreasonable the view taken by the
Swiss courts that those paintings, with their emphasis on
sexuality in some of its crudest forms, were [likely] … to
offend the sense of sexual propriety of persons of ordinary
sensitivity.”
The court followed its own approach on the “margin of
appreciation” points formulated in Handyside, so the result
it achieved is unsurprising. However, the paintings
concerned had not given rise to a public outcry and the
press was unqualifiedly on the artist’s side. It was also true
that the applicant, Muller, had been able to exhibit similar
works in other parts of Switzerland without legal or other
interference. What in effect transpired in Muller, then, was
that the court used an even more provincial standard of art
appreciation and moral over-sensitivity than in Handyside.
By neglecting to impose its own moral standards based on
its members’ arguably greater life experience and greater
maturity of vision as well as superior status, the court was
clearly in dereliction of its duty. It should have considered,
and then asserted, a meta-standard of artistic and moral
insight consonant with its supra-national foundational role.
In the next case, Choudhury v United Kingdom, 12 HRLJ
172 (1991), the Commission held that the fact that
blasphemy protected the feelings of only Christians was not
a breach of Article 9 on freedom of religion. Although the
Commission had only to deal with the Article 9 issue, the
case had important possible implications for art and Article
10. Regarding the substance of the case, if a Christian, as
opposed to a Muslim, had sought injunctions against
Salman Rushdie and his publishers claiming that they had
promulgated in Rushdie’s novel, The Satanic Verses, a
blasphemous libel, then the Commission might have been
obliged to adjudicate on whether it was conceptually
feasible that a work of fiction, of an imaginative not factual
dimension, could ever be capable of conveying literal
blasphemous thoughts on the part of its art-intentioned
and art-expressive author.26
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A similar line of enquiry could have been posed in
relation to the important case of Otto-Preminger Institute v
Austria, E Ct HRR A 295-A (1994), 19 EHRR 34, Eur Ct HR.
Here, the applicant Institute, which operated an “art
cinema” in Innsbruck, wished to show a controversial film
called Das Liebeskinzil. Institute members received a bulletin
that was also posted elsewhere in Innsbruck stating that in
the film “trivial imagery and absurdities of the Christian
creed are targeted in a caricatural (sic) mode and the
relationship between religious beliefs and worldly
mechanisms of oppression is investigated”. Despite the
film possessing this serious artistic remit, in relevant
Austrian courts, culminating in a decision by the Innsbruck
Court of Appeal, the seizure and forfeiture of the film was
permitted on the basis that Mr Zingl, the Institute
manager, had committed the criminal offence of
“disparaging religious doctrines”. When the case went
before the European Court of Human Rights, its judgment
followed the Austrian courts’ enmity towards the film,
which it said portrayed:
“the God of the Jewish religion, the Christian religion and the
Islamic religion as an apparently senile old man….”
It continued:
“Other scenes show the Virgin Mary permitting an obscene
story to be read to her ….The adult Jesus Christ is portrayed
as a low grade mental defective and in one scene is shown
lasciously (sic) attempting to fondle and kiss her breasts,
which she is shown as permitting.”
The film’s merit as a work of art was adjudged by the
court not to outweigh its essential offensiveness to the local
general public. This judgment was reached even though
Article 17a of the Austrian Basic Law specifically protects
freedom of artistic expression, and Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights protects freedom
of expression generally, including artistic expression. The
result of the case was surprising because the film was
explicitly characterised by its promoters as an “art film”
which was to be shown in an “art cinema”. No-one of a
relevant religious persuasion who did not wish to see it was
in any way obliged to go to see it. Moreover, the “art film”
was located within an appropriate “art” environment so
the intended artistic impact of it was contextually clear.
The film can therefore be easily legally defended and
morally vindicated : the film was far from an imposition on
local people, and it was designed to be viewed with the
appropriate psychic and aesthetic attitude appropriate to
art so that ordinary factual offence simply could not result.
It was also situated in a place specifically designated for art
appreciation, and art appreciation only. In view of this
profile, the film could not fairly be judged to be a public
hazard or to be literally blasphemous; its clear remit was
artistic stimulus not factual irreverence.
In a following consistent case, Wingrove v United Kingdom,
24 EHHR 1 (1997), the European Court of Human Rights
had to adjudicate on whether a video film by the applicant
was blasphemous, as had been decided by local censoring
bodies in the United Kingdom. The film, Visions of Ecstasy,
controversially portrayed the erotic experiences of a
putative St Teresa of Avila with a figure representing Christ.
The court upheld the validity of national blasphemy
measures and emphasised yet again the doctrine of the
“margin of appreciation” to avoid replacing the judgment
of the national authorities with its own, pursuing the
conveniently dismissive and politically expedient logic that
the national organs were in a better position to judge local
sentiments regarding blasphemy and related matters. The
court thereby again declined to do its highly important
duty to render considered justice as a human rights
appellate court, electing instead to defer to the legal
wisdom of national authorities despite the fact that the
whole point of appealing to the European Court of Human
Rights is to have an issue actively resolved by that superior
court.
POSTSCRIPT AND CONCLUSIONS
What has happened more recently to the “ public
morality law against art” dynamic that the above cases
exemplify? Article 10 on freedom of expression is not a
much-used provision anyway, but it may be the case, firstly,
that, in view of the seminal decisions adumbrated above,
artists as a particular class are now relatively reluctant to
turn to the European Court of Human Rights because its
record for supporting them is less than distinguished.
Secondly, it might also be the case that national laws are
now more attuned to artistic processes, including their
occasional, revolutionary moral excesses, and there is
consequently a failure to prosecute. Thirdly, it might be the
case that art in general has become less opposed to
conventional morality in its various depictions. It is
submitted, though, that it is premature to think that art’s
cultural autonomy is now recognised by a European-wide
legal exemption from criminal investigation since such an
exceptional category of immunity to legal process in this
realm has not been officially pronounced upon or, even,
more informally registered by arts critics and the general
public.
In some written national constitutions, such as the
Austrian and German models, art is explicitly deemed to
be free. The above case-law analysis shows that even that
sort of ultimate assurance does not necessarily guarantee a
presumption in favour of artistic freedom when art
traverses accepted conventional moral boundaries, even
when it reaches the utmost appellate stage of legal
proceedings in an endeavour to protect itself. Indeed,
under the European Convention on Human Rights, not all
aspects of freedom of expression have been adjudged by
legal commentators to be equally valued. It is now alleged
that a three-tiered scheme of priority of freedoms of
expression have been established by the court: the most
prized is freedom of political expression; this is followed in
terms of importance by freedom of artistic expression; and 27
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freedom of commercial speech is said to be the least-
protected, or to put it another way, the most vulnerable
freedom in the court’s practice. It is the author’s
conviction that the correct order of such a hierarchy may
have to be reappraised in view of the facts revealed by the
above critique of the court’s habitual practice. That analysis
shows, quite conclusively, the severe degree to which artists
have been disadvantaged when appearing before an
important international body which was explicitly
foundationally designed to protect rights such as those
connected with honourable artistic enterprise.
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